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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

DAVID L. HANSEN

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990856-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft of a motor vehicle, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1995) and 76-4-412 (Supp. 1995),
in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Ray M. Harding, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVTEW
1. Did defendant receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel who failed to
request a jury instruction on the statutory affirmative defenses to theft? A claim of
ineffective assistance raised for the first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State
v. Maestas, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 22, f 11,388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (citing State v. Simmons,
866 P.2d 614, 618 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

2. Did the trial court commit plain error in failing to sua sponte give the same
jury instruction on the statutory affirmative defenses to theft referenced in Point I?
This issue is reviewed under uie same standard referenced in Point I. Maestas, 2000
UtahCt. App. at 5 11.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The following rules and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A:
Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David L. Hansen, was charged with one count of theft of a motor
vehicle, a second degree felony (R. 3). A jury found defendant guilty (R. 177). The
trial court sentenced defendant on August 18, 1995, to an indeterminate term of one to
fifteen years to be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving
for forgery (R. 183-184). The court also ordered defendant to pay $817 in restitution
(R. 183-184). Defendant requested a restitution hearing and motioned for a stay of the
time requirement for filing a notice of appeal until after the restitution hearing (R. 186,
188). The trial court granted defendant's motion to stay the time for filing an appeal
until thirty days following the restitution hearing (R. 190). A restitution hearing was
held on October 18, 1995 (R. 193). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on November
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17, 1995 (R. 199).
This Court sua sponte dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction due
to an untimely filing of notice of appeal (R. 214-215). * Defendant was resentenced on
September 1, 1999, (R. 239; 252), and filed a timely notice of appeal on September 30,
1999 (R. 242).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant borrowed Kevin Edwards' truck and Shar Pei dog on the evening of
April 6, 1994, and went "up to the stripper's bar up in Salt Lake" (R. 249:57-58, 60,
70-71). Edwards never saw his truck or dog, nor heard from defendant, again (R.
249:58-60).
The Job
Defendant met Kevin Edwards in jail in early 1994 (R. 249:109). Kevin gave
defendant his mother's home telephone number and told defendant to call if he ever
needed a ride (R. 249:97-98). A day or so before April 6, 1994, defendant called
Kevin's mother, Bethany Westwood, at her home at 139 North 500 East in Provo, Utah

1

In a memorandum decision, this Court held that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(8)(d), "the sentencing process can be completed even if the restitution
determination is deferred" (R. 214-215). Judgment was final in this case when
defendant was sentenced on August 15, 1995, despite the pendency of a restitution
hearing (R. 215). Thus, the trial court's extension of defendant's time to appeal until
thirty days from the November 21, 1995, entry of an order modifying restitution,
impermissibly extended defendant's time for filing a notice of appeal beyond the extra
thirty days allowed by Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (R. 214-215).
3

(the east-side home) (R. 249:44). Kevin was living at another home owned by his
mother at 355 South 600 West in Provo, Utah (the west-side home) (R. 249:54).
Defendant did not have much money (R. 249:60). "His wife had left him or kicked
him out of the house. He had no place to go" (R. 249:57). Defendant briefly told
Bethany that he needed a job and "asked if he could go down to the house that [Kevin]
livefd] in and help clean the yard" (R. 249:44). Defendant stayed with Kevin for a few
days, and Kevin put him to work "clean[ing] up the basement and the back room of the
home at 355 South 600 West" (R. 249:57-58). Defendant had very little money during
the time he lived with Kevin, and Kevin was not aware of defendant having any other
source of income (R. 249:57, 60).
The Truck and the Dog
In 1971, Kevin's father bought a new GMC pickup truck (R. 249:45, 55).
When his father died, Kevin traded another car with his mother in exchange for the
1971 GMC truck (R. 249:55). Accordingly, Kevin's name appeared in the "Owner
Information Section" of the truck's title (R. 249:55; State's Exhibit 1, attached at
Addendum B). In 1988, Kevin borrowed about $3,500 from his mother to make
repairs to the truck (R. 249:45, 56, 65). The repairs consisted primarily of completely
rebuilding the engine (R. 45-46, 56, 65). Bethany insisted that Kevin sign the title over
to her as security for the loan (R. 249:48, 50-51, 56). Pursuant to her request,
Bethany's name was added to the "New Owner's Section" of the title, and Kevin signed
4

his name in the "Owner's Transfer" section of the title on November 30, 1988 (R.
249:50-51, 53, 56; State's Exhibit 1). A notary public witnessed Kevin's signature,
signed the title, and date stamped the document on November 30, 1988 (R. 249:50, 53,
113; State's Exhibit 1).
Bethany had kept the title to die truck in a drawer in her home until she
transferred ownership to Kevin (R. 249:48). When Kevin signed ownership back over
to Bethany, he did not give her back the title document itself; "[a]bout that time [she]
had back surgery, and [she] was very ill" (R. 249:48-49). For "probably a year"
before the theft of the truck, Kevin had kept die title to the truck in die truck's glove
compartment (R. 249:56-57).
Kevin also owned a pedigreed Shar Pei dog worth at least $500, and his
backyard was securely fenced to keep in the dog (R. 249:58-59, 61-62, 71, 85; State's
Exhibit 2). The Shar Pei liked defendant (R. 249:61).
The Theft
During die evening of April 6, 1994, defendant and Kevin sat around drinking at
the east-side home where Kevin lived and discussed going to a stripper bar in Salt Lake
City (R. 249:58, 62-63, 69-70). As mey were getting ready to leave, Kevin's friend
Charlie Peterson stopped by to invite Kevin to go to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting
(R. 249:58, 69-70). While Kevin was changing his shirt, defendant told Charlie about
his marital problems and that "Kevin was going to let him stay there for a few days
5

until he could . . . get on his feet" (R. 249:69-70, 74-75). Kevin decided to go with
Charlie to the meeting instead of with defendant to the stripper bar (R. 249:58, 63, 70).
Defendant, however, still wanted to go to the stripper bar and asked Kevin if he could
borrow Kevin's truck and take the dog with him (R. 249:58, 61, 70-71). Kevin was at
first reluctant to let defendant take the dog, but he ultimately told defendant that he
could take the truck and the dog saying, "But I want you back in a few hours" (R.
249:58, 71-72). Defendant indicated that "he was going to be back later that evening"
(R. 249:70-71). As Kevin and Charlie left to go to the Alcoholics Anonymous
meeting, they observed defendant "putting the dog in the front seat of the truck" (R.
249:60, 71).

H

And that was the last time [Kevin saw defendant] until all of this came

about" (R. 249:58-60). When defendant did not return with the truck and the dog,
Kevin called and informed his mother (R. 249:46, 60-61). Bethany then called the
police and reported that both the car and the dog had been stolen (R. 249:46, 78-79,
84-85).
The Crash and Discovery
After taking the truck, defendant stayed in Utah for about a week and a half (R.
249:103). Although he later claimed Kevin had sold him the truck, defendant did not
attempt to register it in Utah during that time (R. 249:99-100, 103, 113). Defendant
then drove the truck to Montana (R. 249:102-103). He did not attempt to register the
truck in Montana (R. 249:103). After two weeks in Montana, defendant crashed the
6

truck (R. 249:103). Defendant was taken to the hospital, and the truck was towed to a
private wrecking yard (R. 249:103-104, 109).
After getting out of the hospital, defendant "parted the truck out," selling the
rebuilt 350 Chevy engine to Jerry Dawson (R. 249:89, 103). Jerry never inquired
about defendant's ownership of the truck because he intended to buy just the engine and
"[defendant] was selling it, so I just assumed [he owned it]" (R. 249:89-92). The
owner of the wrecking yard did not want the truck on her yard (R. 249:91, 93). She
told Jerry that the truck had to be moved from her premises (R. 249:90-91, 94).
Consequently, Jerry and a friend, who wanted the rear end of the truck, hauled it to
Jerry's friend's logging property a block and a half from the wrecking yard (R. 249:9394).
Jerry was later contacted by Provo City detectives who asked if Jerry knew
where the title to the truck was (R. 249:94-95). Jerry told them he did not, "but [he]
said [he] still thought the cab was down there at the logging place. So . . . [he] went
down there and opened the glove box, and all the paperwork was in the glove box" (R.
249:95).
Defendant was subsequently charged with second degree felony theft of a motor
vehicle (R. 3). The Shar Pei dog was never recovered (R. 249:59, 115).
The Defendant's Story
Defendant testified in his own behalf at trial (R. 249:96). He acknowledged
7

staying with Kevin and did not contest that he took Kevin's truck to Montana with the
intent to keep it (R. 249:99, 102-103, 113). Defendant admitted that he had no bill of
sale for die truck, that his name was not on die title to die truck, and mat, in fact, mere
was noming "on [die title] mat would indicate to [defendant] that mat vehicle [wa]s
[his]" (R. 249:111-112). He maintained, however, that he paid Kevin $650 for the
truck and believed mat ownership of the truck had been transferred to him (R. 249:
99-100, 113). Shown me title to me truck at trial, defendant identified Kevin's
signature in me "Owners Transfer" section, a notary's signature dated November 30,
1988, and Bediany's name in me "New Owner's" section (R. 249:113). Even mough
Bethany's name appeared in me "New Owner's" section of me tide, defendant saw no
need to check widi her regarding sale of me truck (R. 249:113). Defendant claimed he
assumed diat merely having Kevin's signature, along with the notary's signature and
date stamp, on me tide was sufficient to transfer ownership to him (R. 249:104, 112113).
Defendant denied taking die Shar Pei dog, asserting diat it was in Kevin's back
yard when he (defendant) left widi me truck (R. 249:104,115).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Although the State concedes mat defense counsel was deficient in failing to
request a statutory affirmative defense instruction, defendant has failed to show mat he
8

was prejudiced because evidence of his guilt was compelling. Defendant, apparently
impecunious, took the victim's truck and valuable dog, later claiming that he had
purchased the former. However, no bill of sale accompanied the alleged purchase and a
valid title, later found in the truck, showed no sign of defendant's alleged interest in the
truck. Further, defendant never attempted to contact the victim about either the truck or
the missing dog. Finally, notwithstanding the absence of an honest-claim-of-right or
honest-belief-to-control instruction, the jury could not have been deaf to defendant's
repeated expression of his defense theories, or failed to consider them in light of the clear
language of the elements instruction.
POINT II
The State concedes that the trial court committed obvious error in failing to
submit an appropriate affirmative defense instruction. Defendant's trial counsel could
not have had a strategic basis for failing to request an instruction on die theory of the
defense, clearly raised by the evidence, and the affirmative defenses to theft are
statutorily provided for and actually appear in close proximity in the Criminal Code to
the statute providing for the offense of theft. However, as fully set out in Point I,
defendant was not prejudiced.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S
FAHAJRE TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE
STATUTORY DEFENSES TO THEFT
Defendant claims that his trial counsel's failure to request an instruction on the
statutory affirmative defenses to theft constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt.
Br. at 11-14. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show both diat his counsel rendered a deficient performance and that but for the deficiency
there was "a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome."

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694,104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); see also State
v. Bullock, 791 p.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465
(Utah App. 1993).
A.

The State Concedes Defendant's Trial Counsel was Deficient
In Failing to Request an Affirmative Defense Jury Instruction.

Specifically, defendant claims that his trial counsel failed to request an instruction
on the affirmative defenses provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1999), which
states, in pertinent part:
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or exercise
10

control over the property or service as he did[.]
The State concedes that defendant's trial counsel was deficient in failing to
request a jury instruction encompassing these two statutory defenses. "To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance, appellant must demonstrate '"that counsel's actions were
not conscious trial strategy/" and 'that there was a "lack of any conceivable tactical
basis for counsel's actions."'" State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App.
1997). See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 1 32, 984 P.2d 376 (finding counsel
deficient for failing to request an eyewitness identification instruction when "[t]he
record does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would ameliorate or explain that
deficiency").
It is perfectly plain from defendant's testimony (R. 249:100-01, 104, 113, 116),
and trial counsel's opening statement (R. 249:41-42) and closing argument (R. 249:
130-31) that the theory of the defense was that defendant had an honest claim of right to
the truck and believed he had a right to exercise control of the truck. Nodiing in the
record satisfactorily explains trial counsel's failure to request an instruction that would
have provided the jury with clear grounds for acquittal if it found the facts accordingly.
Therefore, defendant has satisfied the first prong of Strickland. Nonetheless,
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance fails.

11

B. Defendant has not Met his Burden under
the Ineffective Assistance Prejudice Prong.
"To establish the prejudice prong [of ineffective assistance of counsel], the
defendant must show 'a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel,
the result would have been different.'" State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah
1998) (quoting State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988)). "'"A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.""' State
v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hall, 946 P.2d
712, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)), aff'd 2000 UT
10, 994 P.2d 1243. In determining whether an error was harmful, a court considers a
number of factors, including "the overall strength of me State's case." State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah
App. 1994). "The more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was
harmful error." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240.
In order to prove defendant guilty of theft of a motor vehicle, the prosecution
was required to prove that defendant "obtainfed] or exercisefed] unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code Ann.
§76-4-404(1999). The evidence of defendant's guilt is compelling. Defendant
admitted that he took Kevin's truck to Montana with the intent to keep it (R. 249:102103, 113). The only contested issue was whether defendant acted in the honest belief
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that he was owner of the truck when he took it.
Defendant admitted that he had no bill of sale for the truck (R. 249:111-112).
Also, assuming arguendo that defendant saw the truck's title before leaving Kevin's
home the evening of April 6, 1994, defendant acknowledged that he knew his name did
not appear on the title (R. 249:112). In fact, defendant testified that there was nothing
"on [the title] that would indicate to [defendant] that that vehicle [wa]s [his]" (R.
249:112). Defendant maintained, however, that "[Bethany's] signature was on it,
[Kevin's] signature was on it, and it was notarized. I thought it was fine" (R.
249:113).
Defendant's purported reliance on these signatures is, by itself, sufficiently
compelling evidence that he did not honestly believe himself to be the owner of the
truck and to sustain his conviction. Kevin's signature on the tide appears in the
"Owner's Transfer" section plainly dated November 30, 1988 (R. 249:50, 52-53, 113;
State's Exhibit 1). The notary's signature also appears in the "Owners Transfer"
section in witness of Kevin's signature and is also plainly date-stamped November 30,
1988 (R. 249:50, 52-53, 113; State's Exhibit 1). Bethany's name appears directly
below those signatures in the "New Owners" section of the title (R. 249:50-51, 113;
State's Exhibit 1). Defendant was thirty-three years old when he allegedly purchased
the truck (Defendant's Exhibit 5). He has a high school education and is able to read
English well (R. 249:107). He can not reasonably be thought to have had an honest
13

belief that a notarized signature from November 8, 1988, could transfer ownership to
him on the evening of April 6, 1994, especially when the name appearing in the "New
Owners" section was Bethany Westwood's and not his own.
Moreover, the clear weight of evidence suggests that defendant never saw the
title from Kevin, but rather subsequently manufactured an inconsistent story about the
alleged transfer of the title. Kevin testified that he kept the truck's title in the glove
compartment of the truck for about a year prior to defendant taking the truck (R.
249:57). Defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to elicit from Kevin that he had gone
to his mother's east-side home with defendant to get the title to give to defendant (R.
249:64). However, defendant himself testified that Kevin went into the bedroom of
"his home" and came back with the title, never asserting that he went with Kevin to
Bethany's east-side home (R. 249:101). After wrecking the truck and selling the
engine, defendant abandoned the truck and did not take the title with him (R. 249:8891, 93-95). In fact, die title was eventually discovered in the glove compartment where
Kevin testified it had been all along (R. 249:95).
Further, the presence of the title in the glove compartment defendant does not
suggest that defendant acted with the honest belief that he owned the truck. Defendant
said that he remained in Utah for a week and a half before leaving for Montana, yet he
did not attempt to register the truck during that time (R. 249:103). Defendant was then
in Montana for two and a half weeks before wrecking the truck, yet he never attempted
14

to register the truck during that time either (R. 249:103).
The taking and failure to return Kevin's dog also suggests defendant's intent to
permanently deprive Kevin of his truck. Kevin testified that defendant also took
Kevin's pure bred Shar Pei dog valued at $500 (R. 249:58-59).2 Although defendant
claims to have legitimately purchased the truck, he never offered an explanation for his
failure to return Kevin's dog, and there is no evidence that he ever tried to contact
Kevin about the dog's disappearance (R. 249:60).
Defendant's impecunious circumstances also strongly suggest a motive to steal
the truck and a valuable dog. Kevin testified that defendant had been kicked out of his
house and needed money (R. 249:57-58, 60). Defendant admitted that he had no car,
that he had stayed at least one night at Kevin's home, and that he spent at least two
weekdays doing nothing but sitting around drinking Kevin's booze (R. 249:97-99, 110111; Defense Exhibit 5 (showing April 6, 1994, was a Wednesday)). Bethany testified
that defendant called saying he needed a job, (R. 249:44), and Charlie testified that
defendant told him Kevin was letting defendant stay with him until "he could get a job
or get on his feet" (R. 249:75). In sum, because the evidence of defendant's guilt was
compelling, there was no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome even if

2

Police reports indicate that Bethany reported both the truck and dog missing
(R. 249:84-86; Defense Exhibit 5). That defendant left with the dog is also
corroborated by Charlie Peterson, who said that he saw defendant put the dog in the
front seat of the truck before leaving Kevin's home (R. 249:71).
15

defendant's trial counsel had requested an affirmative defense instruction.
Finally, notwithstanding the absence of an appropriate affirmative defense
instruction, the jury could not have been deaf to defendant's honest-claim-of-right or
honest-belief-to-control theories and that they provided grounds for acquittal if proven.
The elements instruction for motor vehicle theft required the jury find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant,
4. Obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of
another,
5. Witfi the purpose to deprive die owner diereof[.]
(R. 119).
Defense counsel told the jury in his opening statement that defendant would
claim he purchased the truck legitimately, but was inexperienced in handling me paper
trail connected with such a purchase (R. 249:41-42). In accord, defendant testified
that: (1) he purchased the truck for $650 (R. 249:100); he was naive about the vehicle
purchase requirements, never having purchased a vehicle privately (R. 249:
100); (3) he diought all he needed was a signed tide (R. 249:101); (4) he believed he
was me owner of the car because the tide of me truck appeared proper to him (R.
249:104, 116); (4) based on his belief diat he was the owner of me truck, he did not
feel any obligation to return it (R. 249:104, 106); and (5) he assumed he had good title
in spite of Bemany's name being in me "New Owner's" section of die tide (R.
249:113). Thereafter, defense counsel reiterated in closing argument that defendant
16

thought the title was legitimate, that such a title would appear valid to an inexperienced
buyer, and that defendant intended to buy, not to steal the truck (R. 249: 130-33).
Plainly, the jury heard defendant's theories and, considering the requirements of the
elements instruction, rejected them.
Given the compelling evidence that defendant neither took the truck lawfully nor
acted with the honest belief diat he took the truck lawfully, defendant has not met his
burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the lack of a jury instruction on die
defenses to theft.
POINT n
THE TRIAL COURT'S OBVIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO SUA
SPONTE INSTRUCT THE JURY ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
DID NOT RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE BECAUSE
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT WAS COMPELLING
Although he did not object at trial, defendant now asserts that the trial court
committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the same [statutory] affirmative
defenses to the offense of theft which his counsel deficiently failed to request. Aplt.
Br. at 9. "[J]ury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial will not be
reviewed absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,
608 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995);
Utah R. of Crim. Proc. 19(c). "[I]n most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice'
is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 12117

122 (Utah 1989). In order to show plain error, defendant must show: "(i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant[.]" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
A.

The State does not Contest that Obvious Error
Prongs of the Plain Error Test have been Met.

For purposes of this appeal and in the unique circumstances of this case, the
State does not contest that the obvious error prongs of the plain error test have been
met. The failure to contest this issue should not, however, be construed as a
concession that a trial court is generally under a duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on
all defensive issues arguably raised by the evidence. See State v. Smith, 706 P.2d
1052, 1058 (Utah 1985) (holding that where there was no proposed instruction, and
where the defense dieory argued on appeal was not obvious to the trial court from the
evidence, the trial court had no duty to sua sponte instruct the jury on the defense
theory). "[C]ourts are not required to constantly survey or second-guess the
nonobjecting party's best interests or trial strategy." State v. Labium, 925 P.2d 937,
939 (Utah 1996) (only when "errors are particularly obvious or egregious and would
serve no conceivable strategic purpose" that courts must act sua sponte to prevent "a
manifest procedural or substantial injustice").
Moreover, this Court will find a trial court's instructions adequate if they "g[ive]
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defendant the legal framework for his theory of the case." State v. Standiford, 769 P 2d
254, 266 (Utah 1988). Instructions will be sufficient so long as they correctly state the
law and "allow[] defendant to argue his theory of the case." State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232,
233 (Utah 1985). See also State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (the trial
court need not give a proposed instruction "if the point is properly covered in the other
instructions").
Arguably the trial court did not commit plain error because, as suggested above,
see Aple. Br. at 15-16, the elements instruction necessarily required the jury to
consider defendant's affirmative defense theory. The instruction required the jury to
find defendant guilty only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that, "with a purpose
to deprive," he "obtained or exercised unauthorized control over [Kevin's truck]" (R.
119). Given that the jury could satisfy this requirement only if it rejected defendant's
honest-claim-of-right or honest-belief-in-control theories, which were plainly before the
jury, the elements instruction necessarily embraced the affirmative defense theories set
out in section 76-6-402(3). In conjunction with the elements instruction, other
instructions would have assisted in informing the jury as to defendant's affirmative
defense. Specifically, the jury was instructed that it was to consider all the evidence,
determine its force, and reconcile conflicts to the extent reasonably possible to
determine the ultimate truth (R. 108-09, 114), and that a verdict of guilt required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 107). See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah
19

App. 1998) (the appellate court "'review[s] jury instructions in their entirety to determine
whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law'")
(citation omitted).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State does not oppose defendant's assertion
of obvious error. "A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to
the facts of the case." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997) (citation
omitted). It should have been obvious to the trial court from the evidence that
defendant's only defensive theory was that he "[a]cted in the honest belief that he had
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property . . . as he did[.]" Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-402(3)(b) (1995). Aple. Br. at 15-16. The trial court should also have
seen that there was "no conceivable strategic purpose" for defense counsel to fail to
request an instruction on the relevant statutory defense to theft. Labrum, 925 P.2d at
939. Cf. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) ("The plain error rule exists
to permit review of trial court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from the harm
that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel."). Most importantly, the affirmative
defenses to theft are provided for by statute, section 76-6-402(3), in the very same
chapter as, and separated by only a few pages from, the statute providing for the crime
itself, section 76-6-404. In these unique circumstances, the State concedes that the trial
court plainly erred in failing to give the appropriate affirmative defense instruction
provided for by section 76-6-402(3). Nonetheless, defendant was not prejudiced.
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B. Defendant has not Met his Burden
Under the Plain Error Prejudice Prong.
To establish the prejudice prong of plain error, defendant must show that "absent
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome[.]" Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1208. "The prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
equivalent to the harmfulness test applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker,
2000 UT 51, f 10,

P.2d

(still subject to revision or withdrawal before

publication); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992). In determining
whether an error was harmful, a court considers a number of factors, including "the
overall strength of the State's case." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah
1992); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994). "The more evidence
supporting the verdict, the less likely there was harmful error." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at
240.
For the same reasons that his claim fails on the prejudice prong for plain error,
defendant has not met his burden of showing diat he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
deficient performance. Aple Br. at 11-16.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.

^

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of July, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Margaret P. Lindsay, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight
& Esplin, attorneys for defendant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L," Provo, Utah 846030200, this 2^_of July, 2000.

23

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-402. Pretumpttana and deferne*.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an interest in the
property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the
actor is not entitled to infringe, provided an interest in property for
purposes of this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation.
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor
(a) Acted under an honest claim ofrightto the property or service
involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right to obtain or
exercise control over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property or service
honestly believing that the owner, if present, would have consented.

76-6-404. Theft — Element*
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

76-6-412. Theft — Clarification of offenses — Action for
treble damages.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be
punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is afirearmor an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is
less than $5,000;
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery,
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf,
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal
raised for commercial purposes;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less
than $300.
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(lXbXiii), is civilly
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.
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